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CURRENT ISSUES OF FEDERAL TAX POLICY
Bernard Wolfman *

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a distinct honor to have been selected as the Spring 1994
Altheimer Lecturer, and I thank Dean Eisenberg and the Faculty
of the School of Law for the invitation they extended to me. I also
express my appreciation to the Altheimer Foundation for having
made this Lectureship possible.
Before discussing the particular issues of federal tax policy that
I want to encourage you to think about this evening, it is important
that I indicate what, for me, is the important goal of good tax
policy. In this way you will have before you the yardstick against
which I measure tax policy determinations, and you will be able to
decide for yourselves whether my measurements are right. You may
also decide whether some other yardstick would be more desirable.
By my lights, the goal of federal tax policy should be to raise
the revenue necessary to enable the government to operate and to
fund its general welfare programs effectively, with a fair distribution
of the tax burden, with like transactions and situations treated in
like fashion, and with a minimum of added transaction costs and
economic distortions.
Obviously, in this evening's talk I cannot even begin to discuss
most of the important issues of tax policy that the country should
be facing, and so I have selected four areas that are very important
in themselves and may illustrate principles that will be helpful in
the consideration of others. The four areas I have chosen are capital
gains at death, integration, personal injury recoveries, and simplification.
II.

CAPITAL GAINS AT DEATH

In early January of 1993, a few weeks before his inauguration,
President-elect Clinton floated the idea of taxing the "unrealized"
capital gains of a deceased taxpayer. It was not a new idea, but it

* Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1946, J.D. 1948,
University of Pennsylvania. With a few emendations, this essay sets forth the
Altheimer Lecture which Professor Wolfman delivered at the School of Law of
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock on April 1, 1994.
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had never been pressed hard enough to come close to enactment in
the past. In 1993, it might have made sense for the Clinton Administration to explain the proposal to the public and to urge the
case for its adoption. Instead, the idea was dropped almost immediately because, according to the Wall Street Journal, it had
evoked "strong opposition from powerful interest groups.",
The Clinton Administration had said that it favored a fairer
income tax regime, with a relative increase in tax burden for the
wealthy, and a net increase in revenue to help with deficit reduction.
Taxing capital gains at death would fit well with all three objectives.
Under current law, capital gain (the appreciation in the value of a
security or other asset) is not taxed until the asset is sold. The result
is substantial tax deferral for capital income. And if the taxpayer
never sells the appreciated asset - holding it until death - the income
tax deferral turns into income tax exemption because it gives the
taxpayer's estate and beneficiaries a taxfree step-up in the basis of
the decedent's assets. 2 The Treasury predicted that this exemption
would result in lost revenue of more than $28 billion in 1993 alone,3
and it is an exemption enjoyed principally by the wealthiest segment
of American society.
The Clinton proposal would have continued a complete exemption for assets passing to a spouse or to charity, an exemption
for the first $75,000 of capital gains on assets passing to others,
and a $125,000 exemption for capital gains on the decedent's residence. As a result, 90%o of all taxpayers would, as now, be exempt
from taxation on their unrealized appreciation. Yet, with only the
most affluent taxpayers affected, such a modest change in law would
4
raise $4 to $5 billion in additional revenue each year.
To be sure, technical issues of some intricacy would require
attention before Congress adopted the change. To avoid the wholesale
evasion of taxation of the gains at death, the unrealized gains on
assets made the subject of inter-vivos gifts would have to be taxed,
terminating the shelter of tax deferral earlier than if the donor were
to hold the assets until death. Transition problems would need
solution, and taxpayers would need guidance in establishing the basis
of assets acquired long ago. Liquidity problems would no doubt
require some attention so that in some cases the tax might be made

1. Rick Wartzman, Clinton Suggestion of Possible Capital Gains Tax Upon
Death Stirs Ire Among Powerful Interests, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1993, at A16.
2. I.R.C. §1014 (West 1994).
3. Wartzman, supra note 1.
4. Wartzman, supra note 1.
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payable over time (as the case is now with respect to federal estate
taxes'). But in the end, we would have a more equitable income
tax system and more revenue (or revenue to substitute, perhaps, for
some of the relatively heavy burden of tax imposed on income from
personal services).
In my view, taxing gains at death would advance all of the
goals of good tax policy and could stimulate the economy by reducing
a substantial economic lock-in that current law induces.
III.

INTEGRATION

The federal income tax on corporations is the oldest continuous
internal revenue tax we have. Enacted in 1909, it preceded the
Sixteenth Amendment and the income tax on individuals by four
years. With a tax on corporate income imposed first on the corporation and then on its shareholders when they receive dividends
or sell their stock, our corporate-shareholder income tax system is
understandably dubbed a "double-tax" system. It is more kindly
called the "classical" system. The other major industrialized nations
of the world, our trading partners, used to have the classical system
of double taxation, but over the past several decades have all moved
to integrate their corporate and shareholder income taxes so that
the double tax has been either eliminated or substantially reduced.
From time-to-time corporation-shareholder income tax integration has been discussed in this country and schemes to achieve it
have been proposed. Until recently, however, the studies have been
somewhat superficial, and no strong political force has pressed for
the adoption of an integration proposal. Although one might have
expected corporate managements to support the idea of eliminating
the double tax, the corporate executives of public companies seemed
more concerned that in a single-tax world they would be pressured
to increase their rate of dividends and distribute more of their
earnings, contrary to the preference of management to accumulate
earnings to the extent possible.
In the past few years, however, two major studies have emerged
that propose the enactment of integration systems, one by the Bush
Treasury6 and the other by the American Law Institute (ALI). 7 The

5. I.R.C. §6166 (West 1994).
6. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, Report of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income
Once, No. 92-0073-P (Jan. 1992); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, A Recommendation for
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ALI study would convert the corporate tax into a withholding tax
under which shareholders would take credit on their individual income
tax returns for their share of the corporate tax after grossing up
their dividends to include their proportionate share of the corporate
tax paid. The ALl proposal would operate very much like the familiar
withholding system applicable to wages. The Treasury proposal would
simply permit domestic shareholders to exclude dividends from their
gross income. Professor Fred Peel's 1985 article, A Proposal for
Eliminating Double Taxation of Corporate Dividends, 8 may well
have influenced the Treasury.
I have given you only a simplistic, contrasting summary of the
two most important integration studies, but they both deserve the
careful attention of tax and nontax professionals alike. The issue
of integration should not and will not go away, but it will not
receive full Congressional consideration until the professionals and
their clients have given it their attention and then urge Congress to
take the subject seriously.
Not all students of the subject favor integration for publicly
traded enterprises, faulting both the Treasury and the ALl proposals.
Indeed, an earlier, 1989 ALl study makes a strong, persuasive case
for a reformed, "double-tax" corporate-shareholder tax system, but
one in which corporations would be able to deduct both interest on
debt and, with respect to newly contributed equity, dividends as
well - in effect, a proposal for a form of partial integration. 9 Just
as they have neglected the major integration studies, however, professionals have not paid sufficient attention to basic reform of the
existing system.
In the meantime, how have we dealt with the problems of the
double tax system? Our revisions of the existing system have, with
a few notable exceptions, been non-comprehensive and often laden
with unnecessary complexity. Our system for taxing partnerships and
partners is an integrated one, imposing but a single tax on the

Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems, No. 93-0485-M (Dec.
1992).
7. INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES: REPORTER'S
STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (American Law Institute Federal Income
Tax Project, Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Reporter, 1993).
8. Fred W. Peel, A Proposalfor Eliminating Double Taxation of Corporate
Dividends, 39 TAX LAw. 1 (1985).
9. PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE AcQuIsITIONS AND DISPOsrrIONS AND REPORTER'S

STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIUTIONS (American Law Institute Federal Income Tax
Project, Subchapter C, William D. Andrews, Reporter, 1982); REPORTER'S SUBCHAPTER C SUPPLEMENTAL STUDY (American Law Institute Federal Income Tax
Project, Subchapter C, William D. Andrews, Reporter, 1989).
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partners, but publicly traded partnerships are treated as corporations
for tax purposes 0 and therefore cannot enjoy the single tax world.
Moreover, business realities and state law strictures often demand
a corporate framework. Subchapter S corporations come under a
single tax regime, but the tax law will not permit them to have
more than 35 shareholders nor more than one class of stock." The
latest development, the Limited Liability Company (LLC), is sweeping the country. 12 By the end of 1993, thirty-six states had authorized
their formation; a year earlier only eighteen states had enacted LLC
legislation. The IRS has agreed to treat LLCs as partnerships, making
it possible to provide limited liability for all the investors and a
single-tax system. As with partnerships, however, public trading of
the investor interest in an LLC will cause it to be taxed as a
corporation.
The goals of corporate tax simplification and corporate tax
restructuring ought not be viewed as polar antagonists. They can
and they should go together. For the non-public firm, the evolving
LLC is an innovation that promises integration, simplification, and
flexibility, but it is being achieved without Congressional participation
in the process or Congressional approval of the substantial revenue
loss that it may entail. It seems clear that until there is sustained
Congressional focus on comprehensive corporate tax reform, including the proposals for partial or full integration for publicly
traded companies, piecemeal Code amendments, hit-or-miss administrative action, further complexity, and a lack of coherence are
likely to remain the order of the day.
IV.

PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERIES

Almost from the start the income tax statute has provided that
recoveries for "personal injuries or sickness" are tax-exempt. The
statutory exemption was preceded by several years, however, by IRS
rulings that reached the same result. Congress in effect codified the
administrative position. Unfortunately, neither the Internal Revenue
Service nor Congress indicated in any full or coherent way just why
those recoveries were to be exempt, and the term "personal injury"
was undefined. In the earliest period, the Service took the position
that only a physical injury to the person could constitute a "personal
injury." Later, mental injuries were included, and in 1960 the Treas-

10. I.R.C. §7704 (West 1994).
11. I.R.C. §1361(b)(1) (West 1994).

12. See Bernard Wolfman, Self-Help Integration (LLCs) or Otherwise, 62
NOTES

769 (1994).
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ury issued regulations that appeared to broaden the exemption to
include unspecified injuries, beyond the physical (or mental) if they
were tort-like. 3 Nevertheless, for years the IRS took the position
that defamation recoveries, though resulting from tort, were not
exempt if the defamation occurred in a commercial setting, if it
were not personal defamation. In the end, the Service lost in a few
significant litigated cases, and it finally threw in the towel, accepting
as "personal injury" recoveries, and therefore tax-exempt, all
4
defamation recoveries.
As the defamation cases were winding down, new controversies
arose involving the tax status of recoveries for race and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 and,
more recently, for age discrimination as well. In these discrimination
cases, the recoveries were all for back pay. The statutes did not
provide for ancillary or compensatory damages for psychological
harm or for loss of status or reputation.
The Service could not contend in the discrimination-based cases
that all recoveries awarded in lieu of wages should be taxed on the
ground that they were mere substitutes for the wages which would
have been taxable. It could not do so because the exemption for
''personal injury" recoveries had always been construed to include
the damages for lost wages, past and future, as well as for medical
expenses, disfigurement, and pain and suffering. And so the Service
contended that the discrimination recoveries were not "personal
injury" recoveries because they were not tort-like, and they were
not tort-like because they did not include compensatory damages in
addition to the backpay awards. The lower courts split on the issue,
and finally the Supreme Court resolved it two years ago in the
Burke 6 case. In Burke the Court held for the government on the
ground it had urged, that the recoveries were not sufficiently tortlike. The Court took note of the fact, however, that in 1991, a
year subsequent to the trial court's decision in Burke, Congress had
amended the anti-discrimination laws to provide for broader, more
compensatory recoveries, leading to the conclusion that future recoveries might indeed be sufficiently tort-like to be tax exempt.
Justice Scalia concurred, but in his separate opinion he said
the government had been too generous in providing that any recovery,

13. Treas. Reg. §1.104-1(c) (1960).
14. For citations to the historical materials, see United States v. Burke, 112 S.
Ct. 1867 (1992).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 (1988).
16. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
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although not based on physical or mental injury, would be exempt
merely because the lawsuit had sounded in tort. He based his position
in large part on the fact that the exemption language in the statute
referred to "personal injury or sickness," and he thought that that
juxtaposition suggested something much narrower than tort. Moreover, the whole of Section 104,' 7 the statutory exemption provision,
led him to believe that Congress had focused only on physical, and
possibly mental, injuries. Discrimination awards just did not fit. He
concluded, therefore, that the Treasury regulation 8 was invalid and
that no recoveries were exempt unless they compensated for physical
or mental injury. 9
Since Burke, the Service has gone where its tort-based logic had
led it, as the Court in Burke had implicitly predicted, and has ruled
that discrimination recoveries under the broader, more compensatory
1991 Title VII amendments 2 are tax-exempt. 2' The result is that
those who work and are paid, those who are promoted and paid
more, those not discriminated against, are taxed on all they receive.
Those who recover the equivalent by way of litigation will end up
with considerably more because they are not taxed. Perhaps that is
the sensible outcome, but the problem is that neither the Service
nor the Supreme Court has done anything to suggest what is or is
not sensible. It is just as though the question whether something
makes sense or not is beside the point. Neither the government nor
the Court has deigned to provide a rationale for the exemption for
recoveries for "personal injury or sickness." They have gone off
on a tangent about whether the recoveries are tort-like or not, but
they have not told us why that is a right or sensible test.
Recoveries for physical and mental injury seek to help a person
back into the position of well-being enjoyed by that person prior
to the injury. Since one's well-being, one's happy psyche, is not
taxed, it is not unreasonable (although not essential to an income
tax system) to exclude from taxation the sums recovered for the
purpose of restoring the person to his or her well-being ante. It is
true that the wage portion of a physical injury recovery is not taxed,
although wages are, but that is an oddity that simply does not fit
the rationale. It has long history behind it and little else. It does

17.
18.
19.
caused
this).
20.
21.

I.R.C. §104 (West 1994).
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960).
Presumably, in the case of mental injuries this would involve an injury that
mental sickness (although the Scalia concurrence does not fully develop
42 U.S.C. §§1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-41 I.R.B. 4.
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not make sense, therefore, to build upon the unexplained, irrational
part of the otherwise rational exemption for personal injury recoveries. It also does not make sense to have stretched the personal
injury exemption to include wage-substitute recoveries for purely
workplace phenomena like employment discrimination that are not
hinged to a direct physical or mental injury. The extremity of current
22
law is illustrated by the very recent Tax Court decision in McKay,
a case in which a former executive of Ashland Oil Company, discharged for being a whistle blower, was held tax-exempt on $12
million of a $16 million dollar settlement of a wrongful discharge
case. Twelve million dollars was the amount the taxpayer's settlement
agreement with his former employer expressly allocated to "tortious
personal injury."
Now, all that I have argued is not put forth as gospel. It is
not even to persuade you that in this instance Justice Scalia has
gotten it right. It is put forth only to suggest that in areas where
general statutory language requires administrative and judicial interpretation, the Service and the courts should exercise their responsibility to interpret in light of good tax policy, in light of some
purpose that they can glean from the statutory scheme. It would
have been helpful if at some point someone in Treasury or someone
on a court had discussed what relevance, if any, the breadth of tort
has to an exemption stated to be for "personal injury or sickness."
No one did.
Finally, let me say that it is possible that a very perverse outcome
will develop in the area of tax-exempt personal injury recoveries.
Historically, the collateral source rule prevented a defendant in a
tort case from advising the jury that a wage-substitute recovery
would be tax-exempt in the hands of the plaintiff and from urging
the jury to reduce the damage award in order to make sure that
I
.... plinif
.........
................
ha .... e or so. -would havc bccn
if never injured. Today, however, the collateral source rule has been
eroded. In a growing number of state and federal courts defendants
are permitted to argue to the jury for award diminution because of
the tax exemption. 23 Where this occurs, and the award is trimmed,
it is the defendant, the tortfeasor, not the injured plaintiff, who
gets the benefit of the tax exemption. And so if one were to think
that maybe the exemption, liberally construed, was good just because
it provided a bonanza to someone discriminated against, even that

22. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. No. 16 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
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justification - never a very compelling one - is going by the boards.
Good civil rights law calls for full compensation to those discriminated against, with the burden to be borne by the discriminators.
Good tax policy calls for the awards to be taxed, no more or less
than one's wages are taxed. Very bad policy leads to giving the
discriminators the benefit of a tax subsidy never intended for them.
V.

SIMPLIFICATION

I want to close with an observation about the often bruited
goal of statutory simplification. Understandably, as the Internal
Revenue Code has grown over the last several decades by thousands
of pages from a slim, single volume, to two mammoth volumes,
professionals have bemoaned the difficulties they have in keeping
up, in understanding, and in giving good advice. People have urged
legislative writers to use "plain language," to learn how to write,
and they have urged Congress to legislate less frequently. By my
lights, however, real simplification will come only when the statute
deals with large problems more comprehensively. When Congress is
pressured into making specific, narrow refinements and exceptions,
there is no escape from technical intricacy and lingual convolutions.
Comprehensive solutions to pervasive problems, however, can often
produce transactional simplification and that, in the end, is really
what counts. I will mention three examples of what I mean.
In 1986, Congress repealed the so-called General Utilities doctrine 24
under which, with Congressional codification, corporations were
permitted in some circumstances, by following a maze of particular
transactional paths but not others, to avoid corporate tax when they
realized gain on the disposition of their assets. 25 This tax avoidance
opportunity, available to some but not all, added enormous complexity to corporate transactions. With the repeal of the doctrine,
corporations are more uniformly subject to tax on their asset appreciation when they dispose of assets, and corporate tax rates have
come down across the board. Transactions have been simplified,
and transaction costs have been reduced or eliminated. That, in my
judgment, was real simplification and good tax policy.
In the heyday of tax shelters, from the 1970's to the mid 1980's,
an array of economically wasteful transactions provided high income
taxpayers with widespread opportunities to avoid taxation at the

24. The doctrine developed following the decision in General Utilities & Operating
Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
25. The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine is reflected primarily in I.R.C.
§§311 and 336 (West 1994).
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expense of the Treasury, almost bringing our income tax system to
its knees. It was rescued by the 1986 enactment of the passive activity
loss rules, 26 a set of rules so intricate and convoluted that they have
evoked widespread condemnation on both theoretical and other
grounds. They are not pretty, to be sure, and they are hard to
comprehend in detail. Nevertheless, I suggest that they are a blow
for simplification and fairness. How could that be? Well, since the
available alternative to those rules seems only to be a return to the
situation that antedated them, we are much better off with them.
The passive activity loss rules, virtually single-handedly, with only
relatively minor exceptions, ended the world of tax shelters as we
had come so well to know them. Those complicated shelter transactions, those plans for unneeded condominiums in far off places
and for a never ending stream of office buildings for which there
were no tenants, and for phony loans to finance investments in oil
and gas drilling ventures - they are no more. That is real simplification! Would it have been preferable to deal with the shelter
problem by going through the Code and eliminating or reshaping
the various tax preferences that underlay the shelter transaction?
Yes, of course, in an ideal world, but politically the ideal solutions
were not possible. In a life in which a second best solution is the
only one feasible, the passive activity loss rules look good. Do most
lawyers, or even most tax lawyers, have to deal with the intricacies
of the passive activity loss rules? Not at all. The rules have had
the very prophylactic result for which they were created. Most tax
shelters can be identified immediately when they run afoul of the
rules, and so the existence of the rules has ended the unseemly,
uneconomic, costly tax shelter industry. That is real simplification
and good tax policy.
In 1986, Congress also delivered an important blow for simp,--,--,n

wh-en- it e.lmi.aL.CA Le capiLal gains pe. erentiai

Iate. I

here

may indeed have been reasons for opposing the elimination of the
preference, but there is no doubt that from the perspective of
simplification it was a major step forward. The complicated aspects
of many transactions that were crafted solely to convert ordinary
income into capital gains were eliminated. That crafting took substantial portions of the typical tax lawyer's time although it was
devoid of any economic objective except tax avoidance. Last year,
of course, Congress reversed itself, and we once again have a
substantial capital gains preference. There are many who favored

26. I.R.C. §469 (West 1994).
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that return on the theory that it helps the economy - a much debated,
controversial view to be sure. Every lawyer knows, however, how
the return of the preference has already increased the volume of
tax planning and has contributed to the distorting of ordinary business and commercial transactions just to gain the advantage of the
preferential rate. In a relatively short period of time we have gone
from complexity to substantial simplification and now back to the
27
complexity that an almost 12 point preferential rate has induced.
This has been an interesting and important phenomenon to observe,
but in terms of tax policy it sacrifices a great deal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I hope that when you consider issues of tax policy you will
keep in mind that real tax simplification may not be achieved merely
(or perhaps at all) by statutory brevity or clarity, good though they
would be. Real simplification comes when business transactions can
proceed in a straight-forward manner, when lawyers know they need
not manipulate the form of a deal to gain a tax goodie that is
otherwise unavailable. Tax fairness comes when major unjustified
opportunities of escape from the income tax are eliminated, such
as the taxfree step-up in basis at death and the ever expanding
exemption for "personal injury" recoveries. And comprehensive reform, such as that advocated in the integration proposals and in
the ALI study recommending preservation and reform of the classical
system, is much more likely to help our economy produce more
efficiently and to treat taxpayers even-handedly and fairly than the
narrow, brokered, complicating amendments and exceptions to which
we have become accustomed.

27. The maximum rate on long term capital gains is 28%, I.R.C. §l(h) (West
1994); the top marginal rate on ordinary income is 39.60o0, I.R.C. §l(a)-(g) (West
1994).

